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How Morone parried these attempts of the Emperor, how Borromeo, who often acted for Pius IV., proposed a counter-reform of the temporal power by the Church, how Morone stood for the papal initiative known as the "legatis proponentibus", how he advised against the excommunication of Elizabeth, how he finally brought the council to the end ardently desired by the pope, and how he received the hearty thanks of the Curia for his great services,—all this is set forth in the present useful compilation with a fullness not found elsewhere.

PRESERVED SMITH.

Histoire de la Marine Française. Tome V. La Guerre de Trente Ans: Colbert. Par CHARLES DE LA RONCIÈRE, Conservateur à la Bibliothèque Nationale. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie. 1920. Pp. 748. 40 fr.)

THERE are few additions to our knowledge of naval history that are more warmly welcomed than a new volume of M. de la Roncière's monumental work. Students know well what to expect from it and in the present installment they will find all the familiar qualities which they have learned to appreciate. There is the same exhaustive care, the same wealth of documentation, and the same wide reading in a cosmopolitan mass of authorities. Nothing in any language that could elucidate the subject or place it firmly in its international setting seems to have been overlooked, and the result is that the student feels he can resort to the book with a sense of unusual security.

The volume covers the period from 1635 to 1682. Opening with a continuation of Richelieu's work it gives us an intimate picture of how he endeavored to use the new weapon he had striven to create to influence and enhance the position of France during the Thirty Years War, and how Mazarin built on the foundations his master had laid. Here, in the section on the "War with Spain" (1648-1659), we are given an interesting sight of the first efforts of the Cromwellian navy through French eyes. The point of view is indeed wholly French, and with little or no sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties and ideals of the new-born island republic. But it is none the worse for that, since we have only to master a passing sense of irritation to find we have a brighter light on the natural but intense prejudices which Cromwell's foreign policy had to overcome and to see in the fact that they were overcome in the alliance that eventuated what a solvent of international difficulties a powerful navy can be.

From this point, with a passing cry of lamentation over the withering of the colonial policy which Richelieu had inaugurated, we pass to the last of the Crusades, the "Candian War", and see the medieval enthusiasms of the men that fought contrasted in the men that planned with a wholly modern appreciation of what the command of the Mediterranean meant. It is not within the scope of M. de la Roncière's purpose

to develop such aspects of the history he is writing. Those who know his previous volumes will not expect it. It is sufficient that with rare restraint he has devoted his space and powers to a sober presentation of the facts, which have so long been wanting in their entirety, and has left others well equipped to draw the wider conclusions. They are indeed very obvious and the whole of this section as well as the later one on "France against Continental Europe" will be read as an illuminating prologue to the complex naval and military problems of the following century, in which the forces at the back of the operations of M. de la Roncière's narrative reasserted themselves with ever increasing intensity and in endless variety, till years after Trafalgar was fought. In the period of the present volume we have of course no more than the first traces of the compelling call of the Mediterranean on the Atlantic Maritime Powers, but in the exploits of the Cromwellian admirals and in the Dutch wars—particularly the third—we are shown the pregnant beginnings.

The first Dutch war has been so thoroughly explored in the publications of the British Navy Records Society that it is not to be expected that M. de la Roncière could add much to existing knowledge. For the others he has more to say that is new. Possibly the most interesting contribution he has to make is his treatment of the Battle of Solebay. It is a mark of his general detachment that he does not seek to disguise the sorry part which the French fleet played nor can he find, as was to be hoped, a satisfactory explanation. All he can do is by a skillful selection of extracts to give a vivid impression of the controversy which raged in the French fleet itself after the battle and of the shame and anger that was felt in France in contrast with the high admiration which Michael de Ruyter inspired. As soon as the combined fleet was back in the Thames d'Estrées and Duquesne had each a party in hot altercation and there was a third abusing them both, while Colbert was denouncing d'Estrées for the modesty of his despatch and impressing the doctrine that though modesty is all very well in a private individual it is not a virtue in a commander-in-chief speaking of the arms of the king. The art of writing a despatch, he explains, is to exalt the glory of the nation by emphasizing the exploits of individuals and concealing their shortcomings. Clearly more was expected from the untried fleet, and there seems no foundation for a widespread belief that d'Estrées had instructions to husband his fleet for ulterior objects. On the contrary it appears that the French officers had formal orders from the king to show the English that they would not yield a point to them in valor and staunchness but would even surpass them. The simple explanation seems to lie in the difficulty, which in the British service had been fairly well overcome during the Commonwealth, of providing adequate command for a fleet. Sailors who were accomplished seamen had little experience of tactics or the conduct of large forces. Soldiers who had the experience knew little of the sea. Both were necessary, and

conflict and jealousy were almost inevitable. A general like d'Estrées would not brook the open contempt of an accomplished seaman like Duquesne, and Duquesne being only second in command was not too ready to repair the mistakes of his inexperienced chief. The idea that the French were purposely held back may well have arisen from a general direction that appears to have been given to captains not to engage too precipitately. It was probably the outcome of a piece of advice which M. de la Roncière tells us Charles II. gave when he visited the French fleet at Spithead. Praising the vigor and courage of his allies he warned them that too much ardor may upset the order that is essential in naval actions, and particularly the French predilection for boarding. "It is wrong", he said "to attempt boarding till the enemy is in thorough disorder and even then instead of being content with three or four prizes, the object must be the complete destruction of the enemy's fleet." Strange as it may seem there was a strong touch of Nelson in the Merry Monarch, and if the French showed a marked respect for his opinion it is no wonder.

The mystery of Solebay is but one of the many points on which M. de la Roncière throws fresh light, but it serves well to show how much the richer we are for his long and unremitting labor. Nor is it only on naval operations that his work has value. There is also a section on Colbert's administration which gives in detail a comprehensive account of everything that went to establish France as a first-class naval power and another on the collateral activities of the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*. The volume concludes with the effort made in the years 1680-1683 to curb the Barbary pirates and so rounds off an imperfectly known chapter in history with a fullness of matter which must long remain indispensable for the special period and even beyond the special subject.

JULIAN S. CORBETT.

The Empire at War. Edited by Sir CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. [For the Royal Colonial Institute.] Volume I. (Oxford: University Press. 1921. Pp. xi, 324. 15 s.)

WHILE the World War was in progress the Royal Colonial Institute planned a comprehensive historical work on the subject of British imperial defense, the purpose being "to trace the growth of Imperial co-operation in war time prior to the late War, to give side by side a complete record of the effort made in the late War by every unit of the Overseas Empire from the greatest to the smallest, and also to tell in what particular ways and to what extent the fortunes and the development of each part were affected by the War". When complete it is to consist of five volumes, of which the first, by the general editor, Sir Charles Lucas, has now appeared. The period surveyed in this introductory volume extends from 1655, when troops recruited in the English